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Synthesis of Supervisors Robust Against Sensor
Deception Attacks
Rômulo Meira-Góes Student, IEEE, Stéphane Lafortune Fellow, IEEE, Hervé Marchand
Abstract—We consider feedback control systems where sensor
readings may be compromised by a malicious attacker intending
on causing damage to the system. We study this problem
at the supervisory layer of the control system, using discrete
event systems techniques. We assume that the attacker can
edit the outputs from the sensors of the system before they
reach the supervisory controller. In this context, we formulate
the problem of synthesizing a supervisor that is robust against
the class of edit attacks on the sensor readings and present a
solution methodology for this problem. This methodology blends
techniques from games on automata with imperfect information
with results from supervisory control theory of partially-observed
discrete event systems. Necessary and sufficient conditions are
provided for the investigated problem.
Index Terms—cyber-physical systems, cyber-security, discrete-
event systems, supervisory control.
Protection of feedback control systems against cyber-attacks
in critical infrastructures is an increasingly important problem.
In this paper, we consider sensor deception attacks at the
supervisory layer of a feedback control system. We assume
that the underlying cyber-physical system has been abstracted
as a discrete transition system (the plant in this work), where
sensor outputs belong to a finite set of (observable) events.
These events drive the supervisory controller, or simply su-
pervisor, that controls the high-level behavior of the system
via actuator commands, which also belong to a finite set of
(controllable) events. In the context of this event-driven model,
we incorporate a malicious attacker that has compromised a
subset of the observable events and is able to delete actual
sensor readings or to inject fictitious ones in the communica-
tion channel to the supervisor. The goal of the attacker is to
leverage its knowledge of the plant and the supervisor models,
and to use its event-editing capabilities to steer the plant state
to a critical state where damage to the plant occurs. In this
work, we investigate the problem of synthesizing a supervisor
robust against any attacker with these capabilities.
Several works have addressed in recent years problems
of cyber-security in the above context. In [1], [2], [3], the
authors developed diagnostic tools to detect when controlled
systems are being attacked. Their work is closely related to
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the work on fault diagnosis in discrete event systems, and
it is applicable to both sensor and/or actuator attacks. Our
problem differs from the problem considered in these works
since we aim to compute a supervisor that is robust against
attacks without using a separate diagnostic tool. However, their
method only works for attacks that are detectable/diagnosable
(non-stealthy). Moreover, once an attack is detected, their
solution forces the supervisor to disable all controllable events.
There is also a vast literature in robust control in discrete
event systems [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. However, ro-
bustness in the previous literature is related to communication
delays [8], [9], loss of information [10], or model uncertainty
[4], [5], [7], [6]. Exceptions to that are [11], [12], [13], [14],
where the problem of synthesizing supervisors robust against
attacks was investigated. The results of [13] are related to
actuator deception attacks.
In [11], [12], [13], [15], [14], the problem of synthesizing
supervisors robust against attacks was investigated. Our work
differs from [11], [12], [14] as we provide a general game-
theoretical framework that solves the problem of synthesizing
supervisors robust against general classes of sensor deception
attacks. The solution methodology in [11], [12], [14] follows
the standard supervisory control solution methodology, where
only results about one robust supervisor against a specific class
of sensor deception attacks is provided. Conditions on the
existence of robust supervisors against a possible set of sensor
deception attacks with a normality condition on the plant are
provided in [11]. A methodology to synthesize the supremal
controllable and normal robust supervisor against bounded
sensor deception attacks is given in [12]. The results of [13] are
related to actuator and sensor replacement deception attacks
while actuator and sensor deception attacks are considered
in [15]. However, the supervisory control framework in [15]
differs from the standard framework since the authors assume
that the supervisor can actively change the state of the physical
process. Finally, [14] provides a methodology to synthesize
a maximal controllable and observable supervisor against
unbounded sensor deception attacks.
The game-theoretical framework adopted in this paper pro-
vides necessary and sufficient conditions for the problems of
existence and synthesis of robust supervisors against general
classes of sensor deception attacks. This game-theoretical
approach provides a structure that incorporates all robust
supervisors against sensor deception attacks. Different robust
supervisors can be extracted from this structure, e.g., maximal
controllable and observable, supremal controllable and normal,
etc. In fact, the robust supervisors from [11], [14] are embed-
ded in this structure. Moreover, there is a natural extension of
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our solution methodology such that robust supervisors from
[12] are embedded in this structure as well.
In summary, our work does not impose any normality
condition as imposed in [11], [12] and studies synthesis and
existence of robust supervisors against any sensor deception
attack. Our approach considers both bounded and unbounded
sensor deception attacks. Moreover, necessary and sufficient
conditions are provided for the existence and synthesis of
robust supervisors, whereas in [11] only existence conditions
are provided and in [12] only a sufficient condition is provided.
Of particular relevance to this paper is the work in [16],
where the synthesis of stealthy sensor deception attacks as-
suming a fixed and known supervisor is considered; in this
sense, [16] pertains to attack strategies. Herein, we consider
the “dual” problem of synthesizing a supervisor that is robust
against sensor deception attacks; thus, this paper is focused on
defense strategies.
We wish to synthesize a supervisor that provably prevents
the plant from reaching a critical state despite the fact that
the information it receives from the compromised sensors
may be inaccurate. Our problem formulation is based on the
following considerations. The attack strategy is a parameter
in our problem formulation, i.e., our problem formulation is
parameterized by different classes of sensor deception attacks.
If there is no prior information about the attack strategy,
then an “all-out” attack strategy is considered. Our solution
methodology comprises two steps and leverages techniques
from games on automata under imperfect information and
from supervisory control of partially-observed discrete event
systems. We build a game arena to capture the interaction
of the attacker and the supervisor, under the constraints of
the plant model. The arena defines the solution space over
which the problem of synthesizing supervisors with the desired
robustness properties can be formulated. In this solution space,
called meta-system, we use supervisory control techniques to
enforce such robustness properties. We leverage the existing
theory of supervisory control under partial observation [17],
[18], [19], [20] to solve this meta-supervisory control problem.
As formulated, the meta-supervisory control problem has a
unique solution. This solution embeds all robust supervisors
for the original plant, thereby providing a complete character-
ization of the problem addressed in this paper.
Our presentation is organized as follows. Section I intro-
duces necessary background and the notation used throughout
the paper. In Section II, we formalize the problem of synthesis
of supervisors robust against this attack model. We define
the construction of the game arena and present the solution
of the (meta-)synthesis problem in Section III. Section IV
discusses some benefits of our solution methodology. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section VI.
I. PRELIMINARIES
We assume that the given cyber-physical system has been
abstracted as a discrete transition system that we model as a
finite-state automaton. A finite-state automaton G is defined
as a tuple G = (XG,Σ, δG, x0,G), where XG is the finite set
of states; Σ is the finite set of events; δG : XG × Σ → XG
is the partial transition function; x0,G ∈ XG is the initial
state. The function δG is extended in the usual manner to
domain XG×Σ∗. The language generated by G is defined as
L(G) = {s ∈ Σ∗|δG(x0,G, s)!}, where ! means “is defined”.
In the context of supervisory control of DES [17], system
G needs to be controlled in order to satisfy safety and liveness
specifications. In this work, we consider only safety specifi-
cations. In order to control G, the event set Σ is partitioned
into the set of controllable events and the set of uncontrollable
events, Σc and Σuc. The set of admissible admissible control
decisions is defined as Γ = {γ ⊆ Σ|Σuc ⊆ γ}. A supervisor,
denoted by S, dynamically disables events such that the
controlled behavior is provably “safe”. In other words, S only
disables controllable events to enforce the specification on G.
In addition, when the system is partially observed due to
limited sensing capabilities of G, the event set is also parti-
tioned into Σ = Σo ∪ Σuo, where Σo is the set of observable
events and Σuo is the set of unobservable events. Based on
this second partition, the projection function PΣΣo : Σ
∗ → Σ∗o
is defined for s ∈ Σ∗o and e ∈ Σ recursively as: PΣΣo (ǫ) = ǫ
and PΣΣo (se) = PΣΣo(s)e if e ∈ Σo, PΣΣo(s) otherwise.
The inverse projection P−1ΣΣo : Σ
∗
o → 2
Σ∗ is defined as
P−1ΣΣo(t) = {s ∈ Σ
∗|PΣΣo(s) = t}.
Supervisor S makes its control decisions based on strings of
observable events. Formally, a partial observation supervisor
is a (partial) function S : Σ∗o → Γ. The resulting controlled
behavior is a new DES denoted by S/G, resulting in the
closed-loop language L(S/G), defined in the usual manner
(see, e.g., [21]). Normally, a supervisor S is encoded by an
automaton R known as the supervisor realization, where every
state encodes a control decision. Throughout the paper, we use
interchangeably supervisor S and its realization R.
We also recall the notions of controllability, observability,
and normality for a prefix-closed language K ⊆ L(G). We
say the language K is
• controllable w.r.t. to Σc, if KΣuc ∩ L(G) ⊆ K;
• observable w.r.t. to Σo and Σc, if (∀s ∈ K, ∀e ∈ Σc :
se ∈ K)[P−1ΣΣo(PΣΣo (s))e ∩ L(G) ⊆ K];





Example I.1. We use the following example as illustrative
example throughout the paper. The plant G is depicted in
Fig. 1(a) where Σc = Σo = {a, b}. The supervisor shown
in Fig. 1(b) guarantees that state 4 is unreachable in the
supervised system R/G.
For convenience, we define useful operators and notation
that we use throughout this paper. First, ΓG(Q) is defined as
the set of active events at the set of states Q ⊆ XG of the
automaton G, given by:
ΓG(Q) := {e ∈ Σ|(∃x ∈ Q)[δG(x, e)!]} (1)











(a) Plant G with Σc = {a, b}








Fig. 1: Running example. Observable events have solid arrows
and unobservable events have dashed arrows. Controllable
events have marks across their arrows.
The unobservable reach of the subset of states Q ⊆ XG
under the subset of events γ ⊆ Γ is given by:
URγ(Q) := {x ∈ XG | (∃t ∈ (Σuo ∩ γ)
∗)[x ∈ δG(Q, t)]}
(2)
where δG(Q, t) = ∪x∈Q{δG(x, t)} and we consider
δG(x, t) = ∅ if δG(x, t) is not defined. The observable reach
of the subset of states Q ⊆ XG given the execution of the
observable event e ∈ Σo is defined as:
NXe(Q) := δG(Q, e) (3)
We define by trim(G,Q) the operation that returns the
accessible subautomaton of G after deleting states Q ⊆ XG.
For any string s ∈ Σ∗, |s| is the length of s. We denote by eis
the ith event of s such that s = e1se
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II. ROBUST SUPERVISORY CONTROL AGAINST DECEPTION
ATTACKS
A. Notation
We first define useful notation for this section. Since we con-
sider that the observability properties of the events are static,
and not dynamic, we assume that the attacker only affects
observable events; clearly, an insertion of an unobservable
event would lead to immediate detection of the attacker by
the supervisor (whose transition function is only defined for
observable events). For this reason, we define the set Σa ⊆ Σo
to be the compromised event set. These are the events that the
attacker has the ability to alter, where “alter” means it can
insert or delete events.
We define the set of inserted events Σia = {ei | e ∈ Σa}
and the set of deleted events Σda = {ed | e ∈ Σa}. These sets
represent the actions of an attacker, and we use subscripts to
distinguish them from events generated by G such that Σia ∩




a = ∅. We call the events in Σ as
legitimate events, events that are not insertion nor deletion.




a, Σo,e = Σo ∪ Σ
e
a
and Σm = Σ ∪ Σea.
We define three projection operators with Σm as domain
and Σ as co-domain: (1)M is defined asM(ei) =M(ed) =
M(e) = e for e ∈ Σ; (2) PG(e) =M(e) for e ∈ Σ∪Σda and
PG(e) = ǫ for e ∈ Σia; (3) P
S(e) =M(e) for e ∈ Σ ∪ Σia
and PS(e) = ǫ for e ∈ Σda. The mask M removes subscripts,
when present, from events in Σm, P
G projects an event in Σm
to its actual event execution in G, and PS projects an event
in Σm to its event observation by S.
B. Modeling sensor deception attacks
We assume that the attacker hijacks the communication
channel between the plant and the supervisor and it can modify
the readings of events in Σa, as depicted in Fig. 3. Intuitively,
the attacker is modeled similarly as a supervisor. The attacker
takes its actions based on observing a new event e ∈ Σo
from G and its memory of the past modified string. Note
that, we assume that the attacker observes the same observable
events as the supervisors. Formally, we model an attacker as
a nondeterministic string edit function.
Definition II.1. Given a system G and a subset Σa ⊆ Σo,
an attacker is defined as a partial function fA : Σ
∗
o,e × (Σo ∪
{ǫ}) → 2Σ
∗
o,e \ ∅ s.t. fA satisfies the following constraints
∀s ∈ Σ∗o,e and e ∈ Σo:
1) fA(ǫ, ǫ) ⊆ Σia
∗
; fA(s, ǫ) = {ǫ} when s 6= ǫ;
2) If e ∈ Σo \ Σa: fA(s, e) ⊆ {e}Σia
∗
;
3) If e ∈ Σa: fA(s, e) ⊆ {e, ed}Σia
∗
.
The function fA captures a general model of deception
attack. Namely, fA defines a substitution rule where the
observation e is replaced by a string in the set fA(s, e).
Condition (1) allows event insertions when the plant is in
the initial state and constrains the substitution rule based on
observation of events from G1. Condition (2) constrains the
attacker from erasing e when e is outside of Σa. However,
the attacker may insert an arbitrary string t ∈ Σia
∗
after the
occurrence of e. Lastly, condition (3) allows events e ∈ Σa to
be edited to any string t ∈ {e, ed}Σia
∗
.
For simplicity, we assume that the function fA has been en-
coded into a finite-state automaton A = (XA,Σo,e, δA, x0,A)
where δA is complete with respect to Σo \ Σa and for any
(e ∈ Σa, q ∈ XA) then (δA(q, e)! ∨ δA(q, ed)!). This
assumption will be used later when we explain the composition
in the definition of the closed-loop behavior under attack. Let
A encode an fA, then the function fA is extracted from A as
follows: ∀s ∈ L(A) and e ∈ Σo, fA(s, e) = {t ∈ {e, ed}Σia
∗
|
δA(x0,A, st)!}, fA(ǫ, ǫ) = {t ∈ Σia
∗
| δA(x0,A, t)!}, and
fA(s, e) is undefined for all s ∈ Σ∗o,e \ L(A) and e ∈ Σo.
In Appendix A, we show how to relax the above assumption
on automaton A to encode attack functions.
This formulation provides a simple way to handle attack
functions and it characterizes the behavior of the attacker. It
also provides a way to define specific attackers that are more
constrained than the constraints of Definition II.1, i.e., when
some prior knowledge about the attacker is available. In other
words, the automaton A can encode different attack strategies,
e.g., replacement attack, bounded attack, etc.
One important attack strategy for this problem is the “all-
out” attack strategy introduced in [2], [22]. In this model,
the attacker could attack whenever it is possible. Hereafter,
if there is no prior information about the attack strategy,
1Observe that clause (1) of Def. II.1 corrects a mistake in the corresponding
clause (1) of Def. 2 in [16], where ∅ was inadvertently used instead of {ǫ}
for initializing fA(s, ǫ).
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then we assume that the attacker follows the all-out attack
strategy. The following example provides two attack strategies
for Example I.1, one of these strategies is the all-out strategy.
Example II.2. Attack functions fA1 and fA2 for the system
defined in Example I.1 and Σa = {b} were encoded in
automata A1 and A2 depicted in Fig. 2. Automaton A
1
encodes the all-out strategy for this example. Although the all-
out strategy is a nondeterministic strategy since the attacker
can try all possible combinations of attacks, its automaton
representation is a deterministic automaton. Only one state
is necessary to encode the all-out strategy. Automaton A2
encodes a one sensor reading deletion attack strategy.
1
a,b,bd,bi




(b) A2 - one deletion strategy
Fig. 2: Representation of two attack functions
C. Controlled system under sensor deception attack
The attacker in the controlled system induces a new con-
trolled language. Referring to Fig. 3, R, A and PS together
effectively generate a new supervisor SA for the system G.
Fig. 3: Sensor deception attack framework
To characterize the interaction of attacker A with the
system G and supervisor realization R, we must modify the
behavior of G and R such that it takes into account possible
modifications of A. We use the method in [14], where G and
R are augmented with attack actions providing an attacked
system Ga and an attacked supervisor Ra.
Definition II.2. Given G and Σa, we define the attacked plant
Ga as: Ga = (XGa = XG,Σm = Σ∪Σ
e
a, δGa , x0,Ga = x0,G)
where δGa(x, e) = δG(x, P
G(e)) and δG(x, ǫ) = x.
Similarly to the construction of Ga, we can modify the
behavior of R to reflect the modifications made by an attacker
on the communication channel.
Definition II.3. Given R and Σa, we define the attacked







S(e)) if M(e) ∈ ΓR(x)
x if e ∈ Σia and M(e) 6∈ ΓR(x)
undefined otherwise
We assume that the supervisor “ignores” insertions of con-
trollable events that are not enabled by the current control
action at state x. This assumption is specified by the second
condition in the definition of δRa . Namely, the insertion made
by the attacker is ineffective at this state. In some sense, this
means that the supervisor “knows” that this controllable event
has to be an insertion performed by the attacker, since it is
not an enabled event.
Based on Ga, Ra and A, we define the closed-loop language
of the attacked system to be L(SA/G) = PG(L(Ga||Ra||A)),
where || is the standard parallel composition operator [21].
Recall that the transition function of A is complete with
respect to Σo \ Σa and for any (e ∈ Σa, q ∈ XA) then
δA(q, e)! ∨ δA(q, ed)!. Therefore, the attacker is incapable of
disabling events of G.
Example II.3. We return to our running example. Figure 4
depicts the attacked system Ga, the attacked supervisor Ra,
and the supervised attacked system Ga||Ra||A
1, where A1 is
the all-out attack strategy shown in Fig. 2(a). Note that state









































Fig. 4: Supervisory control under sensor deception attack
Remark II.1. Even though the attack function fA is nonde-
terministic, the language generated by the attacked system
is uniquely defined, i.e., L(SA/G) = PG(L(Ga||Ra||A)).
In [11], the nondeterministic attack function defined therein
generates maximal and minimal attacked languages. Similar
to the problem encountered in [23], the maximal language
possibly contains strings that the supervised plant cannot
generate while the minimal does not define all possible strings
that this controlled plant generates. This issue does not arise
in our context. Our language definition also differs from the
one in [12]. Even though an attacker could have a string of
insertions to send to the supervisor, it does so by sending one
event at the time. On the other hand in [12], the attacker sends
the entire string modification to the supervisor.
D. Robustness against deception attacks
We investigate the problem of synthesizing a supervisor R
robust against the attack strategy A. We assume that the plant
G contains a set of critical states defined as Xcrit ⊂ XG;
these states are unsafe in the sense that they are states where
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physical damage to the plant might occur. Although damage
is defined in relation to the set Xcrit, it could be generalized
in relation to any regular language by state space refinement.
Definition II.4. Supervisor R is robust (against sensor de-
ception attacks) with respect to G, Xcrit and A, if for any
s ∈ L(SA/G) then δG(x0,G, s) 6∈ Xcrit.
The definition of robustness is dependent on the attack
strategy A. Recall that the all-out strategy encompasses all
other attack strategies [2]. Therefore, a supervisor that is robust
against the all-out strategy is robust against any other A [14].
Problem II.1 (Synthesis of Robust Supervisor). Given G,
Xcrit and an attack strategy A, synthesize a robust supervisor
R, if one exists, with respect to G, Xcrit and A.
We are asking that the robust supervisor should prevent the
plant from reaching a critical state regardless of the fact that
it might receive inaccurate information. In other words, the
supervisor will react to every event that it receives, but since
it was designed to be robust to A, the insertions and deletions
that A performs will never cause G to reach Xcrit. This will
be guaranteed by the solution procedure presented in the next
section.
III. META-SUPERVISOR PROBLEM
In this section, we present our approach to solve Prob-
lem II.1. We briefly explain the idea of our approach. Figure 5
shows the connection of the problem formulation space (left
box) and the solution space (right box). The connection
between these two spaces is given by the arrows that cross
the two boxes. These arrows are labeled by results provided
in this section.
In the left box of Fig. 5, we have the problem formulation
space where the supervisor R is unknown. Based on G, Σo,
Σc and A, we construct a meta-system, called A, in a space
where all supervisors are defined. This construction is given
in Definition III.5. The meta-system is part of the proposed
solution space and it is represented in the right box of Fig. 5.
Although all supervisors are defined in A, which is shown
by Proposition III.1, we are only interested in robust supervi-
sors. In order to obtain robust supervisors, we use techniques
of partially observed supervisory control theory [19], [20] in
the meta-system. The structure Asup is obtained via Defini-
tion III.7 and it contains all robust supervisors against sensor
deception attacks on Σa.
Finally, to return to our problem formulation space, we ex-
tract one supervisor, if one exists, from Asup. Such extraction
is given by Algorithm 1.
Fig. 5: Relation of the system and the meta-system
A. Definition
Inspired by the techniques of two-player reachability games,
we construct an arena as it is constructed in these games. In
the arena, player 1 represents the supervisor while player 2
represents the adversarial environment. The arena exhaustively
captures the game between the supervisor and the environ-
ment, where the supervisor selects control decisions (Γ) and
the environment executes events (Σo,e). In the arena, player 1’s
transitions record a control decision made by the supervisor.
On the other hand, player 2’s transitions represent actions of
the plant G or actions of the attacker A. Formally, the arena
is defined as follows.
Definition III.5. Given plant G and attack function A, we
define the arena A as 4-tuple:
A = (Q1 ∪Q2, A1 ∪ A2, h1 ∪ h2, q0) (4)
where,
• Q1 ⊆ 2XG ×XA is the set of states where the supervisor
issues a control decision. Its states have the form of
(S1, S2), where S1 is the estimate of the states (as it
is executed by the plant) of G and S2 is the attacker’s
state. For convenience we define the projection operators
Ii((S1, S2)) = Si for i ∈ {1, 2};
• Q2 ⊆ 2
XG×XA×Γ×({ǫ}∪Σa) is the set of states where
the adversarial environment issues a decision. Its states
have the form (S1, S2, γ, σ), where S1 and S2 are defined
as in Q1 states, γ is the last control decision made by the
supervisor, and σ is related to inserted events. The event
σ is equal to e ∈ Σa if the last transition was ei ∈ Σia,
otherwise it is equal to ǫ. We use the same projection
operators Ii for states in Q2 for i ∈ {1, 2};
• A1 = Γ and A2 = Σo,e are respectively the ac-
tions/decisions of player 1 and player 2;
• h1 : Q1 × A1 → Q2 is built as follows: for any q1 =
(S1, S2) ∈ Q1 and γ ∈ A1
h1(q1, γ) :=
(
URγ(S1), S2, γ, ǫ
)
(5)
• h2 : Q2 × A2 → Q1 ∪ Q2 is built as follows for any
q2 = (S1, S2, γ, σ) ∈ Q2:











if (e ∈ ΓG(S1) ∩ γ)∧




if (σ = e)
undefined otherwise
(6)






S1, δA(S2, ei), γ, e
)













URγ(NXe(S1)), δA(S2, ed), γ, ǫ
)
if (e ∈ ΓG(S1) ∩ γ)∧




• q0 ∈ Q1 is the initial S-state: q0 := ({x0,G}, x0,A).
We explain the definition of the transition functions h1 and
h2 in detail. The definition of h1 is simple and it defines a
transition from player 1 to player 2, which records a control
decision made by the supervisor, and it updates G’s state
estimate according to this decision. On the other hand, h2
is more complex since player 2 has two types of transitions.
The first type is transitions from player 2 to player 1 which
characterizes the visible decision made by the environment
and is related to events in Σo. These transitions are defined
in Eq. (6), and they are illustrated in Fig. 6. In Fig. 6(a), an
event e ∈ Σo that is feasible in G from some state in S1 is
selected; thus, both the state estimate and the attacker’s state
are updated. In Fig 6(b), q2 = (S1, S2, γ, e) ∈ Q2 is reached
after an insertion since e 6= ǫ; thus, G’s state estimate and the
attacker’s state remain unchanged.
(a) First transition of Eq. (6) (b) Second transition of Eq. (6)
Fig. 6: Transition function h2 from player 2 to player 1
Transitions from player 2 to itself characterize invisible,
from the supervisor’s perspective, decisions. They are only
defined for events in Σea . These transitions are defined by
Eqs. (7-8). An attacker can insert any event in e ∈ Σa, as long
as ei is allowed in the current attacker’s state. The inserted
events e ∈ Σia are not going to be seen by the supervisor,
as only the attacker knows it decided to insert the event.
Insertions will be seen by the supervisor as genuine events.
But ei represents here (in the context of the game arena) the
intention of the attacker to insert. Equation (7) (depicted in
Fig. 7(a)) is the unobservable part, where an insertion decision
was selected and the attacker’s state and the fourth component
of q2 ∈ Q2 are updated. The observable part is shown by
Fig. 6(b). In the case of a deleted event, from the supervisor’s
perspective, it is seen as an ǫ event as well. That is, the
supervisor cannot change its control decision when the attacker
deletes an event, as shown in Fig. 7(b).
(a) Transition of Eq. (7) (b) Transition of Eq. (8)
Fig. 7: Transition function h2 from player 2 to player 2
Remark 1: The elements of Q1 and Q2 are defined such
that they incorporate the “sufficient information” (in the sense
of information state in system theory) that each player needs
to make its respective decision. Equations (5-8) guarantee
by construction that the updates of the information states
are consistent with the plant dynamics and the actions of
the attacker. Overall, the arena constructed thereby captures
the possible attacks and all possible supervisors in a finite
structure. We prove both results later on.
Example III.4. We return to our illustrative example to show
results on the construction of the arena. We constructA for the
system G, Xcrit = {4} and A1 depicted in Fig. 2(a). Since
we construct A for the all-out attack strategy, we can omit
the attacker state. The arena has a total of 26 states.Figure 8
illustrates arena A constructed with respect to A1 and G. We
can observe the encoding of insertion and deletion in this
arena. For example, at state ({1}, {a, b, c}, ǫ) the transition
bi goes to state ({1}, {a, b, c}, b) and then transition b takes
state ({1}, {a, b, c}, b) to state ({1}).
For convenience, we extend the definition of h2 based on a
given control decision. Namely, we define a transition function
H2 that always start and end in Q2 states. This notation
simplifies walks in A.
Definition III.6. We define the function H2 : Q2×Σo,e×Γ→
Q2 as:








h1(h2(q, e), γ), if e ∈ Σo
h2(q, e) if e ∈ Σda
h1(h2(h2(q, e),M(e)), γ), if e ∈ Σia
undefined, otherwise
(9)
The function H2 can be recursively extended for
strings s ∈ Σ∗o,e given a sequence of control
decisions γ1 . . . γ|s|, i.e., H2(q, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|) =
H2(H2(q, s




For a fixed supervisor R and attacker A, we obtain the
language L(Ga||Ra||A) which contains the possible string
executions in the attacked system, e.g., strings of events in
Σm = Σ ∪ Σea. Given a string s ∈ PΣmΣo,e(L(Ga||Ra||A)),
we can find the state estimate of Ga after execution of s, i.e.,
the state estimate of Ga under supervision of Ra and attack
strategy A. Formally, this state estimate is
RE(s) ={x ∈ XGa | x = δGa(x0,Ga , t) for
t ∈ P−1ΣmΣo,e(s) ∩ L(Ga||Ra||A)} (10)
In the construction of A, we allow the attacker to insert
events that are not allowed by the current control decision
(see Eq. (7)). Therefore, given a supervisor R, we need to
define its control decisions for all s ∈ Σ∗o, differing from the
usual definition only for s ∈ PΣΣo(L(G)). For this reason, we
extend the function δR to be a complete function in Σo.
∆R(x, e) =
{
δR(x, e) if e ∈ ΓR(x)
x otherwise
(11)
for x ∈ R and e ∈ Σo. Intuitively, ∆R extends δR by simply
ignoring the events that are not defined in δR. The function
∆R is extended to s ∈ Σ∗o as δR is extended. Lastly, we define
the control decision of R for any s ∈ Σ∗o as:
































































Fig. 8: Full arena A
Based on H2 and CR, we show that the arena A computes
the same state estimates based on the supervisor R and attacker
A as the ones computed based on Ga||Ra||A. This result is
shown in Proposition III.1 and its proof is in Appendix B.
Proposition III.1. Given a system G, a supervisor R,
an attack function A and arena A, then for any s ∈
PΣmΣo,e(L(Ga||Ra||A)), we have that
H2(x0, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|)! (13)
I1(H2(x0, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|)) = RE(s) (14)
I2(H2(x0, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|)) = δA(x0,A, s) (15)
where x0 = h1(q0, CR(ǫ)) and γi = CR(PS(si)).
Recall that in the left box of Fig. 5 the supervisor is
unknown. Equation (13) tells us that the arena captures all
possible interactions between any supervisor R and attack
function A with the plant G. It captures all possible interac-
tions since Proposition III.1 is true regardless of the supervisor
R and of the attack function A. This is one of the main
benefits of constructing the arena A. It defines a space where
all supervisors and attacker actions based on A for the plant
G exist.
Moreover, Eqs. (14-15) says that the arena correctly cap-
tures the interaction between the attacker, supervisor and
plant. Equation (14) computes G’s state estimate of based
on the modified string s ∈ PΣmΣo,e(L(Ga||Ra||A)) and the
control decisions taken by R along the observed string. These
estimates capture an agent that has full knowledge of the
modification on the string s and the decisions taken by R.
On the other hand, Eq. (15) establishes the correct state of the
attacker A in the construction of A.
The arena A has, in worst-case, |XA|2|XG| Q1-states and
|XA|(|Σa| + 1)2|XG|+|Σc| Q2-states given that |Γ| ≤ 2|Σc|.
Consequently, the worst-case running time of the construction
of the arena A is O(|XA||Σo|22|XG|+|Σc|) since Σa ⊆ Σo. We
can construct A starting from its initial state and performing
a breadth-first search based on equations h1 and h2.
C. Solution of the Meta-Control problem
Our approach to solve Problem II.1 is to consider the
above-constructed arena A as the uncontrolled system in a
meta-control problem, which is posed as a supervisory control
problem for a partially-observed discrete event system, as
originally considered in [18]. For that reason, we will refer
to A as the meta-system. As will become clear in the fol-
lowing discussion, this supervisory control approach naturally
captures our synthesis objectives, and moreover supervisory
control theory provides a complete characterization of the
solution. Such a methodology was previously used in [24],
[25] for instance; however, in these works the meta-control
problem is a control problem under full observation. The same
situation does not apply in our case, where events in Σea are
unobservable (from the supervisor’s perspective).
To formally pose the meta-control problem, we need a
specification for the meta-system. In fact, the specification
emerges from the corresponding specification in Problem II.1,
which states that the controlled system should never reach any
state in Xcrit. The same specification is to be enforced in A,
where the state estimate of G represents the reachable states
of G. Thus, the specification for the meta-control problem is
that the meta-controlled system should never reach any state
q ∈ Q1 ∪Q2 such that I1(q) ∩Xcrit 6= ∅.
The next step in the meta-control problem formulation is
to specify the controllable and observable events in the meta-
system A. We already mentioned that all e ∈ Σea are unobserv-
able events. In fact, they are the only unobservable events in
A since they are moves of the attacker that the supervisor does
not directly observe. In regard to the controllable events, the
supervisor makes decisions in order to react to the decisions
made by the environment. Therefore, the events in A1 \{Σuc}
are controllable, while those in A2∪{Σuc} are uncontrollable.
Note that, we explicitly exclude the control decision composed
only of uncontrollable events as a meta-controllable event;
the supervisor should always be able to at least enable the
uncontrollable events, otherwise it would not be admissible. In
this way, the supervisor can always issue at least one control
decision, i.e., enable all uncontrollable plant events. We are
now able to formulate the meta-control problem.
Definition III.7. Given A constructed with respect to G and
A, with events E = A1 ∪ A2, Ec = A1 \ {Σuc} as the set
of controllable events and Euo = Σ
e
a as the set of unobserv-
able events. Let Atrim = trim(A,M) be the specification
automaton, where M = {q ∈ QA1 ∪ Q
A
2 |I1(q) ∩Xcrit 6= ∅}
2.
2We use superscripts to differentiate the different arena structures, e.g., A,
Atrim, etc.
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Calculate the supremal controllable and normal sublanguage of
the language of Atrim with respect to the language of A, and
let this supremal sublanguage be generated by the solution-
arena denoted by Asup.
Note that all controllable events in the meta-control problem
are also observable, i.e., Ec ⊆ Eo. Therefore, the control-
lability and observability conditions are equivalent to the
controllability and normality conditions. Hence, in this case,
the supremal controllable and observable sublanguage exists
and is equal to the supremal controllable and normal sublan-
guage; see, e.g., §3.7.5 in [21]. As consequence a supremal
and unique solution of the meta-control problem exists. This
solution is the language generated by the solution-arena Asup.
The state structure of Asup will depend on the algorithm
used to compute the supremal controllable and normal sub-
language of Atrim. One example of the structure of Asup is
provided.
Example III.5. We return to our running example. Based on
A, we obtain Asup using an integrated (for controllability
and normality) iterative algorithm to compute the supre-
mal controllable and normal sublanguage that is based on
preprocessing the input automata to satisfy simultaneously
a strict sub-automaton [21] condition and a State Partition
Automaton [26] condition. As part of the algorithm, one needs
to refine A so that its observer is a state partition automa-
ton (using algorithm in [26]), i.e., to compute A||Obs(A),
where Obs is the observer operation with respect to Euo
[21]. The resulting Asup is depicted in Fig. 9. Each state
in Asup is a tuple, where the first component is a state
in A and the second component is a state in Obs(A),
where obs1 = {({1}, {b, c}, ǫ), ({1}, {b, c}, b), ({3}, {b, c}, ǫ),
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Regardless of the algorithm to obtainAsup, it has a structure
with Q1-like states and Q2-like states, since it accepts a
sublanguage of Atrim. Namely, it has states where only
control decisions are allowed (Q1 states) and states where only
transitions with events in Σo,e are defined (Q2 states). Thus,
we can use the functions previously defined for A in Asup.
Remark III.2. The worst-case running time to obtain the
supremal controllable and normal sublanguage is exponential
in product of the number of states of the system and the
specification [27]. Therefore, the worst-case running time to
obtain the Asup is O(2(|Q1|+|Q2|)
2
).
The way A is constructed is such that it embeds the set
of all supervisors for the original plant G. Therefore, the
uniqueness of the language generated by Asup and the fact
that it is the supremal solution of the meta-control problem
means that the structure Asup embeds a family of supervisors
S, where the controlled behavior generated by each member
of that family does not reach any state in Xcrit. Moreover,
since A is constructed taking into account the attack function
A, this family of supervisors is robust with respect to A. This
leads us to the following result. Its proof is in Appendix B.
Theorem III.1. A supervisor R is a robust
supervisor with respect to A if and only if
(∀s ∈ PΣmΣo,e(L(Ga||Ra||A)))[H
Asup
2 (x0, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|)!],
where x0 = h1(q
Asup
0 , CR(ǫ)) and γi = CR(P
S(si)).
Corollary III.1. Asup = ∅ if and only if there does not exist
any robust supervisor R with respect to attacker A.
Theorem III.1 states that a supervisor is robust if and only if
it is embedded in Asup. Next, Corollary III.1 gives a necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of a solution for
Problem II.1. Given that there exists a robust supervisor,
we provide an algorithm3 to extract a supervisor that solves
Problem II.1. First, we define function H1 as we defined H2.
Definition III.8. Let the function H1 : Q1 × Σo,e × Γ→ Q1
be defined as:








h2(h1(q, γ), e), if e ∈ Σo
q if e ∈ Σda
h2(h2(h1(q, γ), e),M(e)), if e ∈ Σia
undefined, otherwise
(16)
Algorithm 1 Robust Supervisor Extraction
Input: Asup
Output: Rr = (XRr ,Σ, δRr , x0,Rr )
1: x0,Rr = q
Asup
0
2: XRr ← {x0,Rr}, δRr ← ∅
3: Expand(x0,Rr)
4: procedure EXPAND(x)
5: select γ ∈ ΓAsup(x) s.t. ∀γ′ ∈ ΓAsup(x) : γ 6⊂ γ′
6: for all e ∈ Σ ∩ γ do
7: if e ∈ Σo then
8: y = HA
sup
1 (x, e, γ), δRr ← δRr ∪ (x, e, y)
9: XRr ← XRr ∪ {y}
10: if y /∈ XRr then
11: Expand(y)
12: else
13: δRr ← δRr ∪ (x, e, x)
Algorithm 1 starts at the initial state of Asup and performs
a Depth First Search by selecting the largest control decisions
at each state that it visits. By largest, we mean that it selects
a control decision that is not a subset of any other control
decision defined at state x, as described by line 5. Note that,
it is possible to have more than two decisions that satisfy
this condition. In this case, the algorithm selects one of the
3There are different manners for a designer to extract a robust supervisor.
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possible decisions in a nondeterministic manner. The algorithm
terminates since Asup is finite. Moreover, the algorithm only
traverses player 1 states, where the control decisions are
defined.
Corollary III.2. A supervisor Rr constructed by Algorithm
1 is a solution for Problem II.1.
Remark III.3. The worst-case running time of Algorithm 1
is linear in the number of state of Asup. For this reason, the
running time of the entire synthesis procedure is exponential
in the number of states of A. Since the number of states of
A is exponential in the number of states of G, the overall
worst-case running time is double exponential in the number
of states of G, which is one exponential order smaller than
in [12] and one exponential order higher than in [14], two
references that were reviewed in Section I.
Example III.6. To conclude this section, we provide two
supervisors extracted via Algorithm 1. These two supervisors









(b) Robust supervisor R2
Fig. 10: Robust supervisors with respect to A1
IV. SELECTING SUPERVISORS IN THE ROBUST ARENA
Algorithm 1 provides one way of extracting robust super-
visors from Asup. As we explained before, it selects maximal
control decisions in the Q1 states that the algorithm visits.
Example III.6 shows that this extraction does not provide
specific information about the language generated by super-
vised system once a supervisor is selected, other than the
fact that we are choosing a locally maximal control decision.
While supervisor R1 in Fig. 10(a) generates a live language,
supervisor R2 in Fig. 10(b) is blocking. Nonetheless, the space
defined in Asup provides maximum flexibility in extracting
different supervisors since all robust supervisors are embedded
in Asup. The methods in [11], [12], [14] do not provide the
flexibility of Asup since they exploit algorithms of Supervisory
Control Theory where only one supervisor can be obtained at
a time. In fact, when explicit comparisons can be made, the
supervisors obtained by their methods are embedded in the
corresponding Asup.
Another benefit of the construction of Asup is the ability
to exploit results in the area of turn-based two-player graph-
games. Results from these areas can be leveraged to study
different manners of extracting robust supervisors, e.g., to
study quantitative versions of the robust supervisor problem
under some cost model [28], [29], [30].
We provide an example of a supervisor extraction algorithm
based on a quantitative measure. First, we define a measure
over the supervised system R/G, i.e., over the states of
the automaton G||R. Let the set Xdead = {x ∈ XG||R |
ΓG||R(δG||R(x, s)) = ∅ for s ∈ Σ
∗
uo} be the set of states
in G||R that can reach a deadlock state via an unobservable
string. We define r : XG||R → [0,+∞) ∪ {−∞} to be a





−∞ if x ∈ Xcrit
0 if (x, y) ∈ Xdead
c otherwise
(17)
The reward function r punishes states from where the
system G||R might deadlock. Based on the reward function r,






We can generalize Algorithm 1 to incorporate this quanti-
tative measure such that it extracts a supervisor from Asup
that maximizes the measure Reward(R,G). In our running
example, this new method extracts supervisor R1. Further, we
can assume that the attacker tries to minimize Reward(R,G)
in this extraction method. In this scenario, we would pose a
minmax problem in order to select a supervisor from Asup.
We leave these extensions for future work.
V. ROBOT MOTION PLANNING EXAMPLE
We developed a tool4 to automatically construct A, as in
Definition III.5, and to compute Asup. Moreover, Algorithm 1
is also implemented in our tool. Our evaluation was done on
a Linux machine with 2.2GHz CPU and 16GB memory.
We consider a robot moving in a possibly hostile environ-
ment. The robot is assumed to have four different movement
modes that are modeled as controllable and observable events.
The robot moves freely in the workspace shown in Fig. 11(a).
Its initial state is the blue cell denoted as q0 and the red cells
are considered to be obstacles. Moreover, the shaded region
is assumed to be hostile and the sensor readings of the robot
could be under attack. This uncontrolled system is modeled
by the automaton depicted in Fig. 11(b). We want to design
a robust supervisor that enforces the following properties: (1)
the robot must avoid the obstacles; (2) the robot can always
access states q0 and q1.
The set of compromised events is Σa = {E∗,W∗, N∗, S∗}
since we consider that the sensor readings in the shaded
area might be under attack. First, we construct the arena A
considering the all-out attack strategy. The number of states
in A is 18649 states. The state space explosion is due to the
number of control decisions: there are 256 possible control
decisions.
After constructing A, we obtain Asup as described in
Definition III.7. To compute the supremal controllable and
normal sublanguage, we used the algorithm described in
Example III.5. The number of states in Asup is 65358 states.
Note that Asup has more states than A. The larger state space
in Asup is due to necessary preprocessing done by the iterative
algorithm for the computation of the supremal controllable and
normal sublaguage.
4Our software tool is available at: URL. URL will be included upon final
acceptance of the paper.
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(a) Robot workspace: the robot
starts in the blue cell denoted
by q0; the shaded area is con-
sidered hostile and the sensor
































































(b) Model of the robot in the
workspace: Σ = Σc = Σo =
{E,W,N, S,E∗,W ∗, N∗, S∗}
Fig. 11: Robot workspace and attack simulation
Finally, any supervisor selected from Asup is robust against
the all-out attack strategy, i.e., it satisfies property (1). There-
fore, we must select a supervisor that satisfies property (2).
For this reason, we modify Algorithm 1 to extract a supervisor
from Asup such that property (2) is satisfied. This supervisor
is depicted in Fig. 12.
0
























Fig. 12: Robust supervisor for robot in a hostile environment
VI. CONCLUSION
We have considered a class of problems in cyber-security
where sensor readings in a feedback control system may
be manipulated by a malicious attacker. By formulating the
problem at the supervisory control layer of a cyber-physical
system, we were able to leverage techniques from games
on automata under partial information and from supervisory
control of partially-observed discrete event systems to develop
a solution methodology to prevent damage to the system when
some sensor readings may be edited by the attacker. Our
problem formulation is parameterized by an attacker strategy
over a set of compromised events. In this manner, synthesis of
robust supervisors against sensor deception attack strategies is
considered, e.g., bounded attack strategies, replacement attack
strategies, etc. Moreover, if there is no prior information about
the attacker strategy, then we consider the general all-out
attack strategy. A supervisor robust against the all-out attack
strategy is robust against any other sensor deception attack
strategy.
The space defined in Asup provides maximum flexibility
in extracting different supervisors since all robust supervisors
are embedded in Asup. As discussed in Section IV, it would
be interesting to investigate methods to extract supervisors
from Asup in order to satisfy additional constraints, such as
optimality with respect to some quantitative criterion [29],
[28]. Finally, identifying ways to reduce the state space of
the arena by exploiting a suitable notion of state equivalence
is another important research direction.
APPENDIX A
ATTACK FUNCTION ENCODING
In Section II, we assume that the automaton A that encodes
an attack function fA has a transition function complete with
respect to Σo \ Σa and for any (e ∈ Σa, q ∈ XA) then
(δA(q, e)! ∨ δA(q, ed)!). To encode any attack function fA as
an automaton, this assumption does not need to be satisfied.
However, this means that the attacker might “block” the
controlled system if it receives an unexpected event executed
by the plant, i.e., fA(s, e) is undefined.
Based on the above assumption, we relax the completeness
assumption of δA in order to encode any attack function fA as
an automaton. Namely, the partial transition function δA of A
must satisfy one of the following conditions for any q ∈ XA:
(1) (∀e ∈ Σo \ Σa)[δA(q, e)!] and (∀e ∈ Σa)[δA(q, e)! ∨
δA(q, ed)!]; or
(2) (∀e ∈ Σo ∪ Σda)[δA(q, e) is not defined] and (∃e ∈
Σia)[δA(q, e)!];
Condition (2) allows attack strategies where event insertion
is faster than the plant executes events. Note that condition
(2) violates controllability since it temporarily blocks the plant
from executing events. The practicality of this assumption will
depend on the plant’s response time, i.e., this attack condition
is application dependent. Condition (1) remains unchanged,





Proof. The result is proved by induction on the length of the
string s ∈ PΣmΣo,e(L(Ga||Ra||A)).
Before we start the induction proof, we state two important
results. First, we define CRa in the same manner as CR, but
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the control decisions of Ra are defined over Σm. It can be
shown by induction that the following equality holds for any
s ∈ L(Ga||Ra||A):
CR(P
S(s)) = CRa(s) ∩ Σ (19)
Intuitively, Eq. (19) follows since Ra is a copy or R with
insertion and deletions events added based on PS .
Second, the function RE can also be computed recursively
as follows for s ∈ Po,e(L(Ga||Ra||A)) and e ∈ Σo,e:
RE(se) ={x ∈ XGa | x = δGa(δGa(RE(s), e), t) for
t ∈ (Σuo ∩ CRa(se))
∗} (20)
Σuo defines the unobservable events of Ga. Then, only super-
visor Ra disables events in Σuo to be executed in Ga since A
is defined over Σo,e. For this reason, Eq. 20 is equivalent to
Eq. 10.
Induction basis: s = ǫ.
We have that H2(x0, ǫ, ǫ) = h1(q0, CR(ǫ)) is well defined
since h1 is complete with respect to Γ. It also follows that
δA(x0,A, ǫ) = I2(x0) since ǫ ∈ L(Ga||Ra||A) and I2(x0) =
x0,A. We have that I1(H2(x0, ǫ, ǫ)) = URCR(ǫ)(x0,G).
RE(ǫ)
Eq.(10)
= {x ∈ XGa | x = δGa(x0,Ga , t) for
t ∈ P−1ΣmΣo,e(ǫ) ∩ L(Ga||Ra||A)} (21)
Def.II.2
PΣmΣo,e
= {x ∈ XG | x = δG(x0,G, t) for
t ∈ Σ∗uo ∩ L(Ga||Ra||A)} (22)
Def.II.3= {x ∈ XG | x = δG(x0,G, t) for
t ∈ (Σuo ∩ CRa(ǫ))
∗} (23)
Eq.(19)
= {x ∈ XG | x = δG(x0,G, t) for




Induction hypothesis: H2(x0, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|)!,
I1(H2(x0, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|)) = RE(s) and
I2(H2(x0, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|)) = δA(x0,A, s) for all
s ∈ L(Ga||Ra||A) and |s| = n.
Induction step: Let e ∈ Σo,e, s ∈ L(Ga||Ra||A),
|s| = n and se ∈ L(Ga||Ra||A). The induction hypothesis
gives us H2(x0, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|)!, I1(H2(x0, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|)) =
RE(s), and I2(H2(x0, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|)) = δA(x0,A, s). Let q =
H2(x0, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|).
Since se ∈ L(Ga||Ra||A) then it follows
that H2(q, e, γ|se|)!. Moreover, it follows that
I2(H2(x0, se, γ1 . . . γ|se|)) = δA(x0,A, se) by construction of
A.
For equality of Eq. (14), we divide the event e into three
cases.
First, e ∈ Σda. Then, γ|se| = γ|s| Based on the




= {x ∈ XGa | x = δGa(δGa(RE(s), e), t) for




= {x ∈ XG | x = δG(δG(RE(s), P
G(e)), t) for




= {x ∈ XG | x = δG(NXPG(e)(RE(s)), t) for





Let, e ∈ Σia. Based on the construction of A, we have that
I1(H2(q, e, γ|se|)) = URγ|se|(I1(q)).
RE(se)
Eq.(20)
= {x ∈ XGa | x = δGa(δGa(RE(s), e), t) for




= {x ∈ XG | x = δG(δG(RE(s), P
G(e)), t) for
t ∈ (Σuo ∩ CR(P
S(se)))∗} (32)
PG(e)=ǫ
= {x ∈ XG | x = δG(RE(s), t) for





Lastly, e ∈ Σo. Based on the construction of A, we have
that I1(H2(q, e, γ|se|)) = URγ|se|(NXe(I1(q))).
RE(se)
Eq.(20)
= {x ∈ XGa | x = δGa(δGa(RE(s), e), t) for




= {x ∈ XG | x = δG(δG(RE(s), P
G(e)), t) for




= {x ∈ XG | x = δG(NXe(RE(s)), t) for





This concludes our proof.
Theorem III.1
Proof. We start with the only if part. Let R be a robust super-
visor. Proposition III.1 guarantees that HA2 (x0, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|) is
defined for any s ∈ L(Ga||Ra||A) and for any attack function
representation A. To analyze the meta-system A, we have to
define some notation for it.
We are analyzingA as a meta-system, namely as an automa-
ton. The function h is a the combination of the functions h1
and h2. Let E = A1∪A2 be the event set of A, Eo = E \Σae
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the observable event set, Ec = A1 \ {Σuc} the controllable
event set. Moreover, the function η : E∗ → Σ∗o projects
strings in E∗ to strings in Σ∗o. Intuitively, for any s ∈ L(A)
the function η(s) returns the string that is observed by the
supervisor.
We construct the language L ⊂ L(A) recursively as:
1) ǫ ∈ L
2) s ∈ L ∧ h(q0, s) ∈ QA2 ⇒ se ∈ L, ∀e ∈ ΓA(h(q0, s))
3) s ∈ L∧h(q0, s) ∈ QA1 ∧
(




The language L is by construction controllable w.r.t. Ec and
L(A); we show that L is normal w.r.t. Eo and L(A). The result
is shown by contradiction. Assume that L is not normal, then
there exist shortest s ∈ L and t ∈ L(A) \L s.t. P (s) = P (t).
In the construction of L, player 2 is not constrained, meaning
that the shortest strings that belong to L(A) \ L end with an







|t|−1). It implies that η(s|s|−1) =
η(t|t|−1) and CR(η(s|s|−1)) = CR(η(t|t|−1)). By the definition
of L, t ∈ L. This contradicts our assumption.
It is also true that L ⊆ L(Atrim), otherwise R would not
be a robust supervisor. Intuitively, the actions made by player
2 are not constrained in the construction of L. This guarantees
that L embeds all actions of attacker A. The actions of player
1 are constrained based on R and {Σuc}. R is robust and
changing any of its control actions for any string by {Σuc}
will preserve robustness since {Σuc} ⊆ γ for any γ ∈ Γ.
Definition III.7 defines L(Asup) to be the supremal control-
lable and normal sublanguage of L(Atrim) w.r.t. Ec, Eo and
L(A). Since L ⊆ L(Atrim) and it is controllable and normal,
then L ⊆ L(Asup). Therefore, HA
sup
2 (x0, s, γ1 . . . γ|s|)! holds
for all s ∈ PΣmΣo,e(L(Ga||Ra||A)).
For the if part, the result follows from the construction of
A, Atrim and the properties of Asup.
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Loı̈c Hélouët in the preparation of this paper. The authors are
also grateful to the reviewers for their insightful comments.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Thorsley and D. Teneketzis, “Intrusion detection in controlled discrete
event systems,” in Proceedings of the 45th IEEE Conference on Decision
and Control, Dec 2006, pp. 6047–6054.
[2] L. K. Carvalho, Y.-C. Wu, R. Kwong, and S. Lafortune, “Detection
and mitigation of classes of attacks in supervisory control systems,”
Automatica, vol. 97, pp. 121 – 133, 2018.
[3] P. M. Lima, M. V. S. Alves, L. K. Carvalho, and M. V. Moreira, “Security
against communication network attacks of cyber-physical systems,”
Journal of Control, Automation and Electrical Systems, vol. 30, no. 1,
pp. 125–135, Feb 2019.
[4] F. Lin, “Robust and adaptive supervisory control of discrete event
systems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 38, no. 12,
pp. 1848–1852, Dec 1993.
[5] J. Cury and B. Krogh, “Robustness of supervisors for discrete-event
systems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 44, no. 2, pp.
376–379, 1999.
[6] S. Xu and R. Kumar, “Discrete event control under nondeterministic par-
tial observation,” in 2009 IEEE International Conference on Automation
Science and Engineering, Aug 2009, pp. 127–132.
[7] S. Takai, “Maximizing robustness of supervisors for partially observed
discrete event systems,” Automatica, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 531 – 535, 2004.
[8] K. Rohloff, “Bounded sensor failure tolerant supervisory control,” in
11th IFAC International Workshop on Discrete Event Systems, October
2012, pp. 272 – 277.
[9] M. V. S. Alves, J. C. Basilio, A. E. C. da Cunha, L. K. Carvalho, and
M. V. Moreira, “Robust supervisory control against intermittent loss of
observations,” in 12th IFAC International Workshop on Discrete Event
Systems, May 2014, pp. 294 – 299.
[10] F. Lin, “Control of networked discrete event systems: Dealing with
communication delays and losses,” SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 1276–1298, 2014.
[11] M. Wakaiki, P. Tabuada, and J. P. Hespanha, “Supervisory control of
discrete-event systems under attacks,” Dynamic Games and Applica-
tions, Sep 2018.
[12] R. Su, “Supervisor synthesis to thwart cyber attack with bounded sensor
reading alterations,” Automatica, vol. 94, pp. 35 – 44, 2018.
[13] L. Lin, Y. Zhu, and R. Su, “Towards bounded synthesis of resilient
supervisors,” in 2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control
(CDC), 2019, pp. 7659–7664.
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